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One drawback to a propensity for catchy titles is that they often require some 
explanation. That may be the case this evening. Fortunately, the point of this 
paper, if not the title, is simple and straightforward: it is to lodge an argument 
against a common idea about contemporary American culture, and to suggest the 
general outlines of an alternative. The interpretation in question (what I refer to 
as "apocalypse now" arguments) is that a significant, even fundamental, charac-
terization of recent American experience is an unprecedented amount and 
rapidity of "change," however that may be defined.1 A tendency to view one's 
own times as especially portentous, as being the locus of unusually significant and 
dramatic change, may be endemic, but this theme has become particularly widely 
articulated in the past several decades. 
The central document in the popularization of cataclysmic change as a 
predominant feature of modern society is surely Alvin Toffler' s 1970s best seller, 
Future Shock. "Change" is the basic subject of the book. According to Toffler 
the pace of history progressed not in a linear fashion, but multiplied geometri-
cally. This exponential "acceleration of change," the strain of life lived at an "ever 
faster clip," was a "disease" of modernity that threatened massive social break-
down. The fundamental problem facing contemporary Americans was "too much 
change in too short a time." Modern society was being "overwhelmed by 
change." Future Shock bristled with phrases—"supernormal rates of change," 
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society. And for much of our history the United States has been a rapidly 
changing society. I suspect that Americans most affected by the 1960s, the 
"dawning of the Age of Aquarius," a time when apocalyptic and Utopian thinking 
came easily, have been especially preoccupied with change.12 
"Change" is obviously a vaguely defined, variegated, complex thing. Therein 
lies much of the difficulty. It occurs on different levels, and there is not 
necessarily a close correlation beween the levels. It takes place at different rates 
at different places, not only in different societies but also within a single society 
and among different strata and groups of that society. Societies may experience 
intellectual, artistic, cultural, political, economic, or social change at different 
rates and in different ways. My tactic here will be to isolate several levels or 
approaches to discussions of historical change. While some obviously fit my 
argument better than others, I think virtually all suggest that viewing the last half 
of the twentieth century as a period of quiescence and stability is at least as valid 
as the claim that we are going through a period of hypernormal change.13 
Two apocalyptically inclined works, Kennedy's Rise and Fall and Francis 
Fukuyama's controversial essay (and later book), "The End of History," stimu-
lated thinking about large scale, geo-political change.14 The collapse of commu-
nism in Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union have surely been dramatic 
and important events; if the end of the Cold War is not apocalyptic, you may 
wonder, what is? But in many other ways, the period since the end of World War 
II has been one of unusual stability. None of the major events of the arms race 
or the emergence of the non-aligned Third World or the rise and fall of the Cold 
War had more than a negligible effect in nudging the military balance of power 
from the basic structure it assumed at the end of World War II. One would have 
to go back to the Pax Britannia after the Napoleonic Wars to find a comparable 
era of international stability. The U.S. is presently enjoying one of the longest 
periods of freedom from significant military conflicts in our entire history as a 
nation. Furthermore, today's status quo seems likely to extend into the foresee-
able future. 
Turning to the economic side of great power relations, the growing signifi-
cance, first of the OPEC countries, then of Western Europe, and foremost of Japan 
and the "Pacific Rim," is undeniable. But we might also be permitted some 
scepticism regarding the barrage of predictions over the past two decades 
proclaiming the imminent economic collapse of the United States and the coming 
domination of OPEC, the European Union, or Japan or China. Japan's rise has 
been less dramatic than that of the United States and Germany in the nineteenth 
century, and so far there has been no decline of the U.S. corresponding to that of 
Great Britain or France in the early twentieth century. Further, many of the 
economic changes that have occurred are in the nature of a gradual return to status 
quo antebellum, to the basic situation of the early twentieth century, prior to the 
distortions created by World Wars I and II. In short, economically as well as 
militarily and politically, it is at least plausible to suggest that in international 
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relations the last fifty years have been as much characterized by stability and 
countinuity as by dramatic change. 
A common tendency for those living in situations of historical continuity is 
to exaggerate the magnitude of contemporary events, because there is little 
perspective or vantage point for measuring, or assessing comparatively, the 
significance of change that does occur. Thus, for example, the Vietnam War is 
almost routinely treated by historians as a dramatic turning point in our history 
and superpower status. But it took a period of only a half decade from the fall of 
Nixon and Saigon to the presidency of Ronald Reagan to show how exaggerated 
those claims were. The "lessons of Vietnam" had amazingly little effect on 
American foreign policy. For all practical purposes Reagan ignored that the 
Vietnam War happened. And perhaps with some reason. It would surely be 
difficult for generations who witnessed and participated in the momentous 
foreign policy events of the first half of the twentieth century to see Vietnam as 
having the same scale or magnitude. It seems to me at worst dishonest, and at best 
mistaken, for us to portray it so. It may, of course, have had a great psychological 
effect on the generation of those who participated in or opposed the war, but that 
is a different matter. Kissinger's hopeful prediction that Vietnam would be a 
"footnote" to the history of the era may turn out to be fairly accurate in 
international relations. In any case it should require only a modicum of common 
sense to realize that the two World Wars were indeed major turning points in 
history, times when "the fate of the earth" really was in the balance, when the 
outcomes would have been of dramatic significance for Americans and much of 
the rest of the world. Nicaragua, Panama, the Gulf War, and even Vietnam were 
simply not "world historical events" on anything approaching the same scale.15 
Much the same situation prevails when one turns to domestic political and 
economic matters. Watergate was once portrayed as one of the major turning 
points of American history, before fading into near total historical oblivion. The 
energy and farm problems of the 1970s were obsessively commented upon as 
great national crises; they too faded into obscurity. Then the issue of political and 
economic turning points shifted to the significance and depth of what was 
routinely referred to as the "Reagan Revolution." But the non-existence of a real 
"Reagan Revolution" has surely been clearly established, if by nothing else than 
its repetition a decade later by a nearly identical "revolution," the 1994 congres-
sional elections. Despite liberal warnings that conservatives were provoking 
economic crises that were occasionally compared to the Great Depression, and 
even more exaggerated conservative claims that they had rescued the nation from 
fifty years of economic catastrophe, nothing much really happened. The last 
profound changes in the structure of the American economy came with the New 
Deal. Contrary to all of the campaign rhetoric on both sides, Reagan and Gingrich 
did not attempt to dismantle the New Deal; they did not even seriously impinge 
on Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs. Primarily, conservative attacks on 
the welfare state affected additions to the basic structure that occurred under 
Nixon, Ford, and Carter, and even most of their programs were untouched. The 
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the Vikings, an undoubted historical event but one without widely significant 
impact, than of 1492. 
Other elements of future shock theory perhaps have more substance. It is 
hard, for example, to deny the influence of television on American society. Even 
here, however, we may underestimate the degree to which radio and movies 
anticipated and preceded the impact of television. Movies had short runs, 
changed every few days, were often serialized on an almost weekly basis, brought 
us nearly live news in the form of newsreels, and were seen by a wide segment 
of the population on a regular basis.20 Interestingly, in some respects the current 
pay and cable trends in television are returning that medium to something similar 
to the role of movies in the early part of the century. 
Possibly the most important item in both the scholarly and the popular 
perspective on recent change concerns computers, or, more broadly, the "elec-
tronic revolution." This was a central issue for McLuhan, Toffler, and Naisbitt, 
and is mentioned in virtually all history texts as a significant issue. At least since 
Time magazine made a computer its "Machine of the Year" in 1983, the modifiers 
"revolution" and "age" are regularly attached to the word computer. Computers 
seem to me to have a status somewhat similar to that of television: they are surely 
important; it is the unique magnitude of their influence that is in question. And 
again it seems incumbent on those who assert their importance to support their 
statements and not simply expect readers to take their opinions as self-evident 
truth. What, for example, does it really mean to say that we live in an "information 
age?" How, precisely, have computers revolutionized modern life? What strikes 
me, (even as I compose this essay on a personal computer), is that the direct impact 
on most people's lives has been rather limited. The focus has now shifted from 
the clearly oversold personal computer revolution to the Internet. But compared 
with the similarly rapid spread of the automobile, for example, computers still 
seem to have had a smaller historical impact. Fifty years after the invention of the 
automobile, they had had a transforming effect on the culture; fifty years after the 
invention of computers, they remain for many people primarily a form of 
entertainment. After twenty years of home computers, after fifty years of the 
computer age, how fundamentally different would our lives be without them? 
This line of argument could be extended to cover many other topics. At least 
since the discovery of DNA and the publication of The Double Helix (New York, 
1968) breakthroughs in genetics and biological science have been an important 
focus of apocalyptic predictions. The birth control pill and AIDS are other 
common suggestions of events that have changed our lives in fundamental ways. 
Once again, the point of this essay is patently not to deny that Hiroshima, or the 
moon landing, or television, or computers, or genetic cloning are important 
factors of historical change or to deny that scholars ought to be concerned with 
them. It is instead simply to insist that historical change is a relative, comparative 
thing, that the changes of recent years are perhaps not so unique as our journalists 
and pop social scientists would have it, and that the past half century may from 
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a broader perspective seem a time of stability, an era marked by continuity rather 
than by exceptional change. 
Have we really seen in our times technological and industrial changes that 
equal those of the twenty-five years on either side of the turn of the century: the 
automobile and airplane, radio and telephone, the exploitation of electricity and 
the internal combustion engine? This era of immense technological and industrial 
change laid the foundations for the mass/popular culture, consumer based 
capitalism of the twentieth century. Are we not essentially still living off this 
heritage, living out the consolidation and maturing of this particular new world, 
rather that creating a brave new one of our own? I find it hard to believe that 
anyone who could have had the experience of living through both eras would find 
our more recent one a time of unprecedented change. Or, put in more personal 
terms, I think that my children, growing up in the 1980s, probably share more in 
common with their grandparents who grew up in the 1920s and 1930s than those 
grandparents did with their grandparents, who immigrated, homesteaded and 
pioneered in Kansas after the Civil War. 
At least since the expulsion from Eden, work has been one of the basic 
defining characteristics of the human condition. The curse of surviving "by the 
sweat of your brow" has occupied a major part of human existence. How much 
has work changed since World War II? The overall outlines, the necessity of an 
eight-hour-day, forty-hour-week job, have not altered significantly since the 
Great Depression. Indeed, there are a variety of indications that the average 
number of hours worked by Americans has risen in the past thirty years. Compare 
that with the steady reduction in the requirement for work that took place 
preceding World War II. The successful campaign for the eight hour day and forty 
hour work week was one of the transforming achievements of American history, 
but it was substantially accomplished between 1900 and 1940. Since then there 
has been little progress in reducing God's curse on Adam and Eve, particularly 
in the United States. 
Physical mobility is another material foundation of history: it is one of the 
basics of Toffler's argument. Yet one would have to go back to the colonial era 
to find a period with as little change in physical mobility as in the past half century. 
By far the most important element of modern American human transportation, the 
automobile, has changed only negligibly in several decades, as have most forms 
of public transportation. The speed at which most of us get around has if anything 
regressed over recent years. The interstate highway system, begun in the 1950s, 
is the last major transportation innovation experienced by most of us, but even that 
lacks the impact of, say, the Brooklyn Bridge or transcontinental railroad or New 
York subway of earlier years. 
Similar stagnation affects air travel, which is becoming more widespread but 
remains otherwise relatively unchanged since WWII. As just one example, the 
Air Force was still using early 1950s era B-52s in the Persian Gulf War. A 
comparable rate of change in the early twentieth century would have found us 
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Certainly neither movement has fulfilled the expectations of its most ardent 
partisans; there are probably as many reasons for emphasizing the persistence of 
the status quo as to emphasize the positive changes. Most importantly for my 
purposes, since these are not the changes of most apocalypse theorists, they are 
somewhat beside the point here. They do not really weaken the argument against 
the prevalent change thesis. 
To summarize a few points in conclusion: there are obviously some large 
truths in apocalypse now arguments. Compared with pre-industrial, pre-modern 
cultures, change is clearly a dominant feature of modern life. But apocalypse 
theories claim more than that; they concentrate changes that have been a part of 
modernization and industrialization into recent years, to argue that we are still 
experiencing these events as changes, when many of them have been effected for 
years, or even generations. One problem is a loose chronology: American society 
has witnessed the kinds of change Toffier and others discuss, but the era of 
hyperchange was not the period since World War II. At the latest, the Second 
World War was the last truly apocalyptic, watershed era in American history. 
There is little wrong with journalists exaggerating changes in society. And 
for reformers of all sorts, people who want society to respond to any manner of 
problems, exaggerating the developments of the present is a time-honored way 
of getting the public's attention. This too may be perfectly legitimate. No one 
should expect reformers or popular writers to compare the present too closely and 
too constantly to the past. 
But it is precisely the professional business of the historian to do this: to have 
a longer vision, and to impart it to students and to a public audience. If we do not, 
surely no one else will. To portray CD players or cellular telephones or voice mail 
or the Internet as technological developments that are revolutionizing society is 
fine for the limited time frame of pop culture futurists, but historians should know 
better. Public memory and vision may be short: the purpose of history is to make 
them a little longer. 
This will not be easy. The apocalyptic argument is in essence about progress. 
And despite all of the talk about the demise of that idea in American society in the 
twentieth century, it remains one of the most deeply embedded, passionately felt 
aspects of our culture. Apocalypse now thinking reaffirms our belief in progress. 
At bottom the gee-whiz world-of-tomorrow fantasies of Utopian change just 
around the corner, still with us at Epcot and with our apocalyptic futurists, are 
paeans to the idol of material progress. While I hardly want to challenge or explore 
the notion of progress here, I do think it too easy a solution to bolster our own 
(faltering?) sense of progress by diminishing its presence in the past. The 
argument, expressed graphically by Kenneth Boulding, that the "world of today 
... is as different from the world in which I was born as that world was from Julius 
Caesar's" is at best a gross distortion of historical reality when applied to 
contemporary America.21 
The argument presented in this essay is sketchy and thinly developed in the 
extreme. If it has been at all successful it has raised more questions than it has 
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settled. I hope that I have provided the impetus to encourage some of you to think 
with me about the nature of change, and of how to situate our contemporary era 
in the larger context of American history. Perhaps, as I suggest, a rethinking of 
this small part of contemporary American culture is in order. If not, at the very 
least apocalyptic change interpretations should be confirmed and placed on a 
more solid foundation by specific, detailed examination. 
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